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Wireless Mobile Phone Technology, Deregulation Policy,
Competition and Economic welfare in Nigeria’s Telecom
Industry: An Analytic model
Onochie Jude Dieli1
(Prairie View A&M University)

ABSTRACT
This analytic model is about the Nigerian telecom industry’s structural change
caused by the arrival of a new wireless mobile phone technology. Nigeria’s telecom
industry transformed from natural monopoly to competitive market as a result of
deregulation that occurred in 1999. Under the price regulation using underground
or above the ground cable telephone lines, it could run only with the help of
government subsidies. This study argues that the arrival of a new telecom
technology was the key to success of Nigeria’s deregulation of its telecom industry.
An analysis of a simple microeconomic model shows that with the new wireless
technology, which requires much lower operation cost, the operator can now make
a positive profit and therefore by deregulating the market, entries of new firms and
competition takes place in the industry which lowers the final product price in the
telecom market. The research, therefore, concludes that availability of wireless
mobile phone technology led to deregulation of the industry which brought
competition by increasing the number of firms in the industry that engendered fall
in product price and increase in output. The study observed that the policy of
deregulation is intended to usher in perfect competition but it is far from achieving
that now for the industry displays behaviour similar to monopolistic competitive
and oligopolistic industries. However, one thing is clear, it will never be a natural
monopoly again.
Keywords: Natural Monopoly, Wireless Mobile Phone Technology, Deregulation
Policy, Competition
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INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the deregulation of Nigeria telecom industry made possible by
the availability of wireless mobile phone technology. The industry was fully
deregulated in 1999. This study covers the period 1999 to 2015. This process began
in 1992, marked by the establishment of NCC (Nigeria Communication
Commission). The enabling law is Decree 75. After the implementation of
deregulation policy in Nigeria’s telecom industry, it is pertinent to investigate its
impact on volume of output, number of carriers, and changes in product price in the
sector. It is expected that the policy action will exert positive effects on competition
(perfect competition) which is one of the hallmarks of market economy.
Therefore, this paper is set to answer the research question: does deregulation
policy implementation in Nigeria increase the number of firms (number of phone
carriers), quantity of output and lower price of product in Nigeria’s telecom
industry?
Reviews of literature
Natural monopoly encourages regulation which is the heaviest handed of governing
instrument options in public utility provision (Wilson, K. G. (1992). This scares
away investors. As we all know private investment is driven by profit and where
policies that guide participation in an industry is anti-competition, growth and
expansion will be hindered thereby limiting consumer welfare. This creates the
desire for deregulation by pro-growth governments because it will increase
investment in the provision of essential products at a reduced price.
There are major articles that stress different patterns of investment namely,
Ghemawat (1984), Kato (2009), Klepper (1996). Kato’s model argues along with
Ghemawat (1984). Both focus on the growth of investment efficiency as firms grow
while others held similar points to Kato (2009) but offered incomplete explanations
to the facts. Ghemawat (1984) claims that firms can acquire cost advantage by the
process of learning that is based on cumulative gross investment. This has a cost
advantage because the largest firms pre-empt all other firms to first invest and grow.
This model has an investment size that is exogenously determined and has only an
investment stage. Kato (2009), identified investment as a variable where firms
determine optimally at each date the size of their investment. Kato identifies
increasing returns in the cost of growth whereby large firms can grow more easily.
Kato identified multiple rest points as a result of strong increasing returns in the
adjustment cost function. Klepper (1996) asserted that research helps create
advantage of size through firm expansion. It is established that research helps in
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pushing down average costs. This advantage brings the opportunity of further
research and innovation in large firms. This would in turn lead to decreased average
cost and greater volume of output and fall in price. Deregulation liberalizes
industries, removes bottlenecks to entry and assures competition which leads to
growth and lowers product prize hence increases consumer welfare. This study is
set to find if Nigeria telecom consumer products markets have been affected by the
implementation of deregulation policy of 1999 in the direction of increasing
number of firms(competition), volume of output and reducing of product price.
According to Gupta (2013), deregulation increases consumer welfare in terms of
products and services by reinforcing network and other externalities in a positive
way. Deregulation, therefore, frees the market from regulation which attracts
investment that increases output and lowers price.
THE ANALYTIC MODEL

Natural Monopoly, Technological change and Deregulation

A firm that is a sole supplier to the market is called a monopoly. It is at liberty to
produce at any point of the market demand curve. In contrast, a natural monopoly
holds economies of scale very important. It depicts a situation where only one firm
can survive, or, in other words, where one firm can only produce and supply the
market at a lower per unit-cost than when two or more firms operate in the industry.
It can be concluded to be a situation on the cost-technology of an industry where
operation of one firm is more efficient. There are numerous examples of natural
monopolies, such as public utilities. The telephone, electric power and pipe borne
water supply industries are examples of natural monopolies. More explicitly, the
gas companies (multiple gas lines underground may not be desirable, hence one
single provider); and telephone services rendered by Nigeria Telecommunications
Company (NITEL) before deregulation in 1999, AT&T phone services before
deregulation in USA in 1996 and electricity services provided by Power Holding
Company of Nigeria (PHCN) are all examples of natural monopolies.
A firm is a natural monopoly when its cost function C (q) is sub-additive such that:
𝑁
i
i
C (∑𝑁
𝑖=0 𝑞 ) < ∑𝑖=0 𝐶 (q )

(1.1)

for all quantities q1... qN for which
i
∑𝑁
𝑖=0 𝑞 = q.
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The sub-additive average cost function represents economics of scale which is an
essential property inherent in a natural monopoly. The implication is that
production by one firm is socially less expensive when average costs are put into
consideration. A firm that has a sub-additive cost function has the capability to
produce at lower cost any given output than when the number of firms is more than
one. The firm must have equal aggregate output capability with other firms.
Therefore, sub-additivity guarantees the lowest total cost when there is only one
supplier in the market. By all standards, the telecom industry in Nigeria was a
natural monopoly before deregulation with NITEL as the incumbent firm. So, it is
worthwhile to use a simple model to analyze the pricing options available to the
natural monopoly under unregulated and regulated pricing systems. These graphical
and mathematical analytics justify the implementation of Nigeria’s deregulation
policy. This model explains the NITEL’s loss of monopoly power and subsidy from
the government of Nigeria with the advent of wireless mobile technology.
It is further clarified in the texts that sub-additivity does not mean decreasing
average cost (economies of scale), even though the latter exists in sub-additivity.
This paper, in analyzing a regulated natural monopoly, made consumer surplus and
profit a measure of welfare. It also assumed that the equality of price and marginal
cost is a necessary condition for welfare maximization. However, the monopolist
whose key interest is to maximize profit will not fix p = mc in an unregulated natural
monopoly. A monopoly firm would rather aspire to increase its profits by supplying
the quantity qm where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
This is the likely option of output levels a profit maximizing firm would fix its
quantity, and it is accompanied by huge deadweight loss.
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Option 1. 1 Unregulated Natural Monopoly/Pricing
p

MC( 𝛽, 𝑞)

pm

AC( 𝛽, 𝑞)

qm

q
D(𝛼, 𝑞)

MR (𝛼, 𝑞)

Figure 1.1 Unregulated Natural Monopoly
The figure 1.1 shows the demand curve D (𝛼, 𝑞) the marginal revenue MR (𝛼, 𝑞),
and the average cost AC (𝛽, 𝑞) where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are slopes of marginal revenue and
average cost, respectively. The price is taken on the vertical axis and the quantity
is taken on the horizontal axis. The monopolist in this market can only sell the
quantity, qm, where the monopoly price is set at pm. Note, at this point, MR (𝛼, 𝑞),
is equal to the, MC (𝛽, 𝑞). The monopolist makes a positive profit,𝑞𝑚 {𝑝𝑚 −
𝐴𝐶(𝛽, 𝑞𝑚 )} > 0, as shown in Figure 1.1.
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Regulation of Monopoly Pricing
Consider a firm that faces an inverse market demand function, p (𝛼q). The firm’s
problem is to find a profit-maximizing production, q, as:
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑝(𝛼, 𝑞)𝑞– C (𝛽, 𝑞),

(1.2)

𝑞

where
C (β, q) is the cost of producing quantity q
The first-order condition to this maximization problem is
FOC: p (𝛼, 𝑞) + 𝑝q (𝛼, 𝑞)𝑞 - Cq(𝛽, 𝑞) = 0

(1.3)

We may define the terms in eq. (1.3) as:
p (𝛼, 𝑞) +pq (𝛼, 𝑞)𝑞 ≡ 𝑀𝑅(𝛼, 𝑞)
and
Cq (𝛽, 𝑞) ≡ 𝑀𝐶(𝛽, 𝑞)

(1.5)

Thus, the firm should produce at q which satisfies
MR (𝛼, 𝑞) = 𝑀𝐶(𝛽, 𝑞)

(1.6)

(1.4)

In the model above, q is the quantity while p is the market price. C (q) is the market
cost of producing q. The constants 𝛼 and β are the slopes of marginal revenue and
marginal cost functions, respectively.
The profit maximizing/unregulated monopoly (monopoly firm or monopolist) will
set the price (pm) by going to where MR = MC.
The MR is the incremental money brought in by selling a unit more of the product
while MC is the incremental cost incurred while producing and selling an additional
unit.
An exchange is made when the money brought in is greater or equal to the
additional cost incurred to produce and deliver the product to the consumer. By
producing the profit maximizing quantity (qm), the market would incur a
deadweight loss as shown below in figure 1.2.
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p

pm

MC( 𝛽, 𝑞)

a

AC( 𝛽, 𝑞)

pmc

b

d

c

qm

q

qmc

D(𝛼, 𝑞)

MR (𝛼, 𝑞)

Figure 1.2 Natural Monopoly and Deadweight Loss
This is because the consumers are ready to buy at pmc that is price is set where
marginal cost intersects demand curve (MC= p) and the resultant quantity is q mc.
The deadweight loss is equal to the shaded area (abcd) that lies between the
demand (DD) line and the marginal cost (MC) line, which represents the amount of
underproduction. It is the integral of the area between inverse demand and marginal
cost from the monopoly output (qm) to the welfare-maximizing output (qmc).
𝑞

Deadweight loss =∫𝑞𝑚𝑐 p (𝛼, 𝑞) − 𝑀𝐶(𝛽, 𝑞)𝑑𝑞.
𝑚
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The deadweight loss that arises from an unregulated monopoly justifies the price
regulation by a policymaker. In order to minimize this, a policymaker might
consider these two types of price regulations below.

Option 1.2 Marginal-Cost-Pricing Regulation/Pricing
The second pricing option in a natural monopoly model is to produce the quantity
where price equals marginal cost. Here, where p = MC is the marginal-costpricing regulation marked pmc on the graph. This price option is the best for the
consumer because the price is lower than the monopoly price and there is no
deadweight loss as shown below.
p

MC( 𝛽, 𝑞)

pm

AC( 𝛽, 𝑞)

pmc

qm

q

qmc

D(𝛼, 𝑞)

MR (𝛼, 𝑞)

Figure 1.3 Regulated Natural Monopoly with Marginal-Cost-Pricing
Regulation
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In figure 1.3, the monopolist produces the welfare-maximizing quantity (qmc) that
satisfies the following equation:
𝑝(𝛼, 𝑞) = 𝑀𝐶(𝛽, 𝑞)

(1.8)

The arrow on the vertical axis (price axis) shows that there is a significant price fall
from the price of the profit maximizing monopolist to the welfare maximizing
monopolist. Moreover, there is also a noticeable increase in quantity as indicated
by the arrows on the quantity axis. However, when price is set where p = MC, it is
observed that the price pmc is below the average cost (AC) at the quantity (qmc).
When average cost is above the price, it is crystal clear that the firm would earn a
negative profit. The only way for the firm to survive is for the government to
subsidize the monopolist.
p

MC( 𝛽, 𝑞)

pm

Subsidy

a

b

pmcf

AC( 𝛽, 𝑞)

c

qm

q

qmc

D(𝛼, 𝑞)

MR (𝛼, 𝑞)

Figure 1.4 Government Subsidies under Marginal-Cost-Pricing Regulation
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The monopolist receives a subsidy
S = 𝑞𝑚𝑐 {AC (𝛽, 𝑞𝑚𝑐 ) − MC(𝛽, 𝑞𝑚𝑐 )}

(1.9)

such that its operation is at breakeven point. In figure 1.6, the amount of subsidy
is abcf.
Furthermore, when the regulator fixes P = MC as solution to produce the welfaremaximizing quantity of output and MC < AC then the monopolist firm is not
financially viable because of economic loss and must receive subsidy. This issue of
a subsidy is always controversial. In order to avert this issue, the policymaker
regulates natural monopolies in such a way that they earn zero economic profit
(normal rate of return). Next we discuss the average-cost-pricing option.
Option 1.3 Average Cost Pricing Regulation/ Pricing
p

MC( 𝛽, 𝑞)

pm

pac

AC( 𝛽, 𝑞)

pmc

qm

qac

q

qmc

D(𝛼, 𝑞)

MR (𝛼, 𝑞)

Figure 1.5: Average cost pricing
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When the average-cost-pricing regulation is imposed, the monopolist produces the
quantity that earns zero profit, i.e.,
𝑝(𝛼, 𝑞) = 𝐴𝐶(𝛽, 𝑞)
(1.10)
Thus subsidization is unnecessary in this case. If the price is set where the demand
curve (D) and the average cost (AC) intersects, it provides a best of both world’s
solutions. Here, the price (p ac) is lower than what it would be if the government left
the industry unregulated and the dead weight loss is smaller though the quantity
qac< qmc but qac> qm. The government would not have to subsidize the company.
The demerit is that the company lacks the incentive to keep cost low, and, as a
result, average cost will simply rise and costs will subsequently be pushed to the
consumers. Actually, the telecom industry in Nigeria as a natural monopoly was
making negative profit without subsidies. This assertion can be confirmed by the
records of the Bureau for Public Enterprises as cited by Okonjo-Iweala2, 2012. It
was found that for a period of 26 years (1973 to 1999), Nigeria invested over $100
billion (USD) in its public enterprises. NITEL, as a government corporation got on
the average $3 billion (USD) per year in subsidies. It was against this background
that the Federal government of Nigeria decided in 1999 to implement deregulation
policy in the telecoms industry to seize the opportunity of the arrival of relatively
cheap new wireless phone technology to reduce average costs and save the state
from waste.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN A MONOPOLY MARKET
The telecom markets worldwide experienced technological innovation through
digital wireless mobile phones. The providers create networks via satellite
technology. There are currently three providers namely Global Service for Mobile
Communications, Code Division Multiple Access and Integrated Digital Enhanced
Network. The mobile phone technology is far cheaper and less cumbersome to
provide than the analog technology that uses cable lines laid underground. To cap
it all, we have now numerous wireless networking capabilities. They are integrating
as they are emerging. It can be deduced as well as expected, that based on the
current trend, these technologies will produce faster-speed and longer-distance
capabilities. An example of the one already in place is Wi-Fi, which is limited to
buildings, Campuses and business premises.

2

Ngozi Okonjo - Former Managing Director of the World Bank and the
Coordinating/Finance Minister of Nigeria’s Economy 2015.
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There exists also worldwide inter-operability for Microwave Access (WiMAX),
which allows its wireless service everywhere.
In the USA, T-Mobile and Cingular 3 use GSM technology, Verizon and Sprint
Wireless use Code Division Multiple Access technology (CDMA technology),
Nextel uses iDEN. Nigeria’s neighbor South Africa has been already enjoying this
service before 1999 through their major phone companies, including MTN South
Africa, which is GSM technology. Other West African countries such as Niger,
Togo, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Benin also have access to these cheap wireless phone
technologies. So after studying the cost effectiveness, capabilities and accessibility
of wireless phone services, the government of Nigeria in a conscious effort to
reduce government subsidies to corporations, encourages private participation to
enhance efficiency. Nigeria deregulated the telecom industry in order to remove
NITEL’s drain from the State’s treasury with the expectation of maximum
utilization of its cost effectiveness for social welfare and economic growth.
When the Nigerian telecom industry experienced an introduction of new technology
(Mobile phone technology), it witnessed a significant reduction in the production
cost of its service. For example, it was costing NITEL over one hundred million
naira to lay underground telephone cables for an area of ten kilometers square
radius before, but now it costs mobile phone companies ten million naira to install
a satellite transmission station that covers the same area (NCC,2012). This fall in
the cost of production implies a decrease in product price. So, in applying the law
of market forces, a fall in cost of production permits a rise in supply of the product.
Therefore, the firm can now make a positive profit. At this stage, Nigeria’s telecom
industry is no longer a natural monopoly because other firms can enter the industry
and incur positive profit. It is economically wise to deregulate the industry as it will
invite entries of additional firms to participate which engenders competition and its
attendant benefits in the telecom industry

3

There was a merger between Cingular and AT&T in 2004, and recently Sprint
and Nextel joined to form a big organization
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IndividualFirm

Figure 1.6a Effects of Technological Shock in a Natural Monopoly
The curves of marginal Cost (MC1) and Average Cost (AC1) represent the
respective costs of the individual firm before the emergence of new technology
while the curves of marginal cost (MC2) and average cost (AC2) denote the
respective costs after the arrival of new technology. The latter set of curves show a
decrease in cost of production as proposed by the model. The symbol P m stands for
monopoly price while Pmc depicts marginal cost pricing. The competitive price in
figure 1.6b below is represented by Pc and MR stands for marginal revenue.
The figure1.6a (left –side graph) is a given representation of a natural monopoly
(individual firm) before technology shock with monopoly price (pm) and quantity
(qm). The price, pm, and the quantity, qm, are set in such a way to maximize profit,
i.e. MR = MC, and it leads to deadweight loss. This pricing is not welfare friendly
but with the imposition of marginal cost regulation where price is set to marginal
cost (MC = P), the price falls, the quantity rises and therefore, welfare improves.
However, the government has to subsidize the natural monopolist for it to break
even because price is below average cost.
Furthermore, in figure 1.6a (left-side graph), the monopolist makes negative
economic profit under marginal cost because price is below average cost. The
shaded portion of the graph highlighted by the arrow is the negative profit. This
actually inhibited entry as well as competition in the industry because firms in the
industry are making a negative profit. This is the reason why there is no entry of
new firms and competition in the industry before the technology shock.
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Suddenly, a new technology – wireless phone technology shock was experienced
in the telecom industry which reduced the cost of production from AC 1 to AC2 as
shown in the right-side graph with new marginal cost MC2. After the arrival of new
technology in the industry, the monopolist firm does not need a subsidy to continue
with marginal cost pricing as shown in figure 1.6a (right-side graph). At the rightside graph, the monopolist makes a positive profit under the marginal cost pricing
represented by the shaded area with reduced cost of production. The government
does not need to subsidize the industry with marginal cost pricing since the firm
can make a profit as a result of new technology, which has reduced cost to AC2 and
moved down marginal cost price to a point lower than its former high position. This
is possible because the cost of production has decreased from AC 1 to AC2. At this
point in time, it is advisable to deregulate the sector, so that other firms can enter
and take advantage of the positive profit until it is zero. This is good for the industry
and the economy because it will enhance availability of product at a considerable
rate (price). It will also make possible the provision of efficient services.
Individual firm

Industry

S1
MC1(β,q)

AC1(β,q)

pm

pm
MC2(β,q)

pmc1

S2

pmc1

S3

AC2(β,q) pmc2

pmc2
pc

pc

d

MR
qm

qmc1

qc qmc2

D
q

Q
Qm

Qmc1 Qmc2 Qc

Figure 1.6b Effects of Deregulation on Individual firm and Industry
In figure 1.6 b (left-side and right–side graphs), it can be deduced from figure 1.6b
(left-side graph); that the monopolist firm does need government financial
intervention at the marginal pricing to remain in business. But with the new
technology, the firm can run the industry with profit and not incur deadweight loss
at any price where MC2 equals demand (D). This is because the new technology
has reduced the cost of production to AC2 as shown by the left-side graph.
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Any price above pc where MC2 cuts D leaves the monopolist with a positive profit
in a marginal cost pricing. Here, there is no deadweight loss, no negative profit and
no allocative inefficiencies of monopoly that fix price above marginal cost. In
addition, more quantity is produced at qmc than at qm. With the deregulation policy
in effect, more firms enter the industries to take advantage of the profit which
produces an inside shift of the demand curve (d) with increased competition.
It continues shifting until profit is zero. This increases availability of product to Qc
as shown above. In the figure 1.6b (right-side graph), it can be seen that if the
industry remains a monopoly, it can continue supplying the telecom product at S 1
at price pmc1 with a subsidy covering cost and making negative profit. The fact is
that there is only an individual monopolist firm in the industry so the industry–wide
output should be equal to what a monopolist produces. Hence, the interactions of
technology and market forces produce a new equilibrium where the average cost
(AC2) intersects marginal cost (MC2) at price pmc2 with positive profit at an
increased quantity. The monopolist firm, therefore, gives the lowest price p mc2 and
highest quantity oqmc2. It is pertinent to state here that qmc2 is the total quantity
supplied in the industry by a monopolist before deregulation. It has shown a
significant decrease in price and increase in quantity at positive profit. More firms
can now enter the industry as a result of deregulation and this produces the
competitive price Pc which leads to an increase in industry aggregate supply as
denoted by curve (S3) with quantity Qc and inside shrinking of individual firm’s
demand curve to the left. As competition continues, the price falls to the lowest ebb
pc and lower quantity than oqmc2 to oqc. It is pertinent to state here that qmc is the
total quantity supplied in the industry by a monopolist.
Thus, a deregulation policy can now trigger more entry of other firms since the
average cost is low. As entry continues, an individual firm’s demand curve shifts
to d as shown in figure 1.6b (left-side graph). The process continues until an
individual firm’s profit becomes zero. This entry of new firms is represented by
industry supply function S3 and at a competitive offer price of pc.
The industry-wide supply increases from Qmc2 to Qc due to entry of firms as shown
in 1.6b (right-side graph). It was, therefore, economically wise for the Nigerian
government to remove barriers to competition in the telecom industry by
deregulating the industry. This is because more entries of firms into the industry
would engender competition, lower production cost, improve allocative efficiency
and reduce product price. Entry should be encouraged to the extent that demand for
the monopolist firm’s product would decrease to the point where individual firm
makes zero profit. This is depicted by point: p = mc = ac, in the left-side graph of
1.6b.
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In the alternative, it can be said that a technological shock reduces the marginal and
average costs of production as follows:
AC1 (𝛽, 𝑞) > AC 2 (𝛽, 𝑞)

(1.11)

MC1 (𝛽, 𝑞) > MC2 (𝛽, 𝑞)

(1.12)

and

and also, the cost function becomes super-additive
𝑁
i
i
C (∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑞 ) > ∑𝑖=1 𝐶(𝑞 )

(1.13)

for all quantities q1, …, qN for which
i
∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑞 = q.

(1.14)

Sub-additivity is a necessary and sufficient condition for natural monopoly, and
now technological shock has led to super–additivity, which implies that more than
one firm can operate in the industry, producing a proportion of the same product
and still enjoy economies of scale. It is, then, economically advisable to open the
industry to competition -- to liberalize or deregulate the industry as this will lead to
competition, efficiency, a rise in output and affordable, low prices for the greater
welfare of the society.
As noted above, deregulation of the industry becomes attractive as the cost function
is super-additive rather than sub-additive; it is financially viable for more firms to
operate in the industry. This is because the high average cost which made it difficult
for more than one firm to produce has gone down drastically due to the arrival of
wireless technology that has reduced the cost of doing business. If an industry is no
longer in the state of natural monopoly due to technological progress, liberalizing
the monopoly market becomes a good option for the government as this will reduce
government involvement in the industry to a supervisory role rather than a player
with invested capital/fund in the industry. The gain that is derivable from this
deregulation of the telecom sector is that funds that should have gone out from the
government through subsidy will be conserved and channeled towards other
developmental projects. When a deregulation policy is implemented, competition
subsequently emerges as more than one firm is allowed to operate in the industry.
An increase in the number of competitors (more firms entering the industry), and
the opening up of the industry leads to an increase in output and a further fall in
price. In summary, the above model predicts that technological shock can bring a
change in the status of a natural monopoly to perfect competition.
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For example, if high total cost inhibits the development of competition in an
industry, technology can reduce the cost of production on arrival, which makes it
possible for more individual firms to enter the industry and invest as a result of low
average costs which will lead to an increase in output and fall in price. This scenario
is a good development for the consumer’s welfare.
RESULTS
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Figure 1.9 Phone Calls Billing (Source of Data: NCC, 2015)
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CONCLUSION
The Nigeria telecom industry prior to the implementation of the deregulation policy
had only NITEL, a government monopoly, as the only firm operating in the industry
which up till 1999 could give Nigeria, a country of about 200 million people,
450,000 telephone lines but with deregulation, Nigeria can boast of 130,760,406
million functional phone lines (NCC, 2015). Deregulation enhances competition. It
brought private investors both domestic and international with enormous capital
into the industry. The number of carriers goes up. The cost of production went down
as a result of availability of mobile phone technology and more firms entered the
industry. This fall in the cost of production led to fall in product price. With more
firms’ entry, competition ensued and this led to increase in the industry-wide
supply. This hence reduces the product price. The Nigerian data showed that before
the deregulation, it was costing about 25naira/min to make a domestic call within a
city, 150naira/min inter-Nigerian states and 250naira/min or more internationally
but post deregulation data showed a drastic reduction in the domestic and
international billing rates. According to the data, it now costs less than 4naira/min
for domestic calls and less than 20naira/min for international calls. In summary, the
study answers the research question: “Does deregulation policy implementation as
explained by analytic model increase the number of firms (number of phone
carriers), quantity of output and lower price in Nigeria’s telecom industry? Based
on the Nigerian data analyzed above the answer is in the affirmative.
However, the Nigeria telecom industry is not a perfect competition rather tends to
some form of competition similar to monopolistic and oligopolistic competitions.
It will never be a natural monopoly.
REFERENCES
Crawford, S. (2013), “Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and Monopoly
Power in the New Gilded Age.”
Connecting the Globe, “A regulator’s Guide to Building a global information
community: competition in telecommunication services” Retrieved from
http://transition.fcc.gov/connectglobe/sec5.html
David Carr (2013, May 19), “Telecom’s big players hold back the future” The New
York Times
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/business/media/telecomsbig-players-hold-back-the-future. html?r=0

©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2020

.

18

ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy

Wireless Mobile Phone Technology in Nigeria

Dieli

Ghemawat, P. (1984), ‘Capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry,’ The
Journal of Industrial Economics, 33(2), 145-163.
Gort, M and S. Klepper (1982), ‘Time paths in the diffusion of product
innovations,’ The Economic Journal, 92(367), 630-653.
Gupta, A. (2013) "Estimating direct gains in consumer welfare
telecommunications sector", Journal of Consumer Policy, 36(2), 119-138.

in

Klepper, S. (1996), ‘Entry, exit growth and innovation over the product life cycle,’
American Economic Review, 86(3), 562-583.
Mika, K. (2009), ‘The Role of investment efficiency in the industry life cycle,’
Industrial and Corporate Change, pp. 1-22.
Nigeria Population Commission (NPC), 2010, “Census figures of Nigerian
population” Retrieved from services.gov.ng/national-population-commission
Nigerian Communications Commission (2013), “Telecommunication statistics”
Retrieved from http://www.ncc.gov.ng/
Okonjo-Iweala, N (2012), ‘Reforming the Unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria.
The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England.
Wilson, K. G. (1992). Deregulating telecommunications and the problem of natural
monopoly: a critique of economics in telecommunications policy. Media, Culture
& Society, 14(3), 343–368. https://doi.org/10.1177/016344392014003002
World
Bank,
“Economic
http://www.worldbank.org/

©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2020

.

indicator

Data”

19

Retrieved

from

ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy

